The substitute
by Anna Tilroe
Ian Kerkhof is no more. No one has heard anything from him since he left the Netherlands under dramatic circumstances in 1999 and headed for South Africa, the land where he was born and raised. Someone else has taken his place and has assimilated everything having anything to do with Kerkhof. That may come as a shock to those who expected so much from this talked-about filmmaker, but fortunately there’s been “no real loss. Because although Kerkhof may have disappeared as a name, there seems to be no end to his output as a creative spirit. Books, films, drawings and written work appear one after another, and these plus an endless series of pamphlets, e-mails and web publications all point to a mentality that reflects Kerkhof’s down to the most minute details. It’s just that all the work is signed nowadays by a certain Aryan Kaganof.

Does the name change really matter? Strictly speaking, no. After all, we say that a work of art is autonomous and greater than its maker. Yet in the past few centuries more and more emphasis has been placed on the name of the maker, so much so that we may well ask whether something hasn’t gone totally awry. Oddly enough, this is a question that has attracted very little discussion, even though at the deepest level it touches on the place of art in our society. Everyone can see that the signature of the artist has become a brand name that determines not only the market value of the work of art but also its significance in the scope of art history and in contemporary society. Likewise, we know that branding as an economic and artistic principle has become so prevalent in the art world that even leading exhibition organizers have become trademarks. These international curators establish name recognition by developing themes that appear to lend a certain urgency to art. It doesn’t really matter if the urgency is understood within society as a whole, or even if it corresponds with the intentions of the chosen artists. The brand name, after all, is not a dialogue but a system, as closed as fundamentalist belief.

What the exact reasons were for Kerkhof’s discarding his name like a moth-eaten suit is something we will never know. But if we properly understand what Kaganof is hinting at, name recognition and everything that goes with it today is fatal to the pursuit of art. In his eyes, an artist is not a personality who keeps giving shape to his specific identity in a way that is recognizable, but a chameleon-like personage, a transparent figure whose absence of identity enables him to be fully receptive to the form, colour, odour and sex of all that surrounds him. It might even be said that this lack of identity, according to a text that Kaganof distributed among his friends and acquaintances, is a cardinal rule for anyone who calls himself an artist, especially if he or she is driven by the ambition to create a masterpiece. Like Kaganof.
The text was written in 1936 by Gertrude Stein and was entitled What Are Master-pieces And Why There Are So Few Of Them. Identity, she wrote in her familiar unrestrained flow of words that I am paraphrasing here, has to do with what you remember about yourself. It is a form of illustrating yourself based on your memory, and although that may be good for people who want to establish a persona that they and others can recognize, it is not good for the making of a masterpiece. A masterpiece can only be created when nothing prior has been laid down and when a conscious effort has been made to relinquish every form of identity.

Kaganof advances Stein’s argument for doing away with identity just when economic globalism and mass migration have brought the idea of cultural and personal identity into sharp focus. As a white man who left South African in protest against Apartheid, he is undoubtedly well aware of this. But, as you might gather from his written work and his films, it is not the task of the artist to create or maintain any kind of identity but to see behind, beneath, beside or through the masquerades, institutions and systems that support it. Because therein lies that which people have in common, that which unites them and makes them human.
A splendid example of this is the film Nice to meet you, please don’t rape me!, made in 1994 during the first round of democratic elections held in South Africa. In this work we follow four men, three black and one white, who have found each other on the seamy side of life in South Africa and try to help each other out as best they can. None of them has an identity in the form of a legal name, a permanent place of residence, a wife, family or possessions. All we learn about them is that they are lost in a society that is marked by vengeance, moral degeneration, and spiritual and physical violation. Their mutual suspicion and aggression, often influenced by alcohol and drugs, lead to fierce outbursts of rage and violence that they are constantly struggling to keep in check with regard to each other by means of pacifying rituals. Each one perceives to a greater or lesser degree that he needs the other, not so much to survive in a desolate, bloodthirsty urban jungle, because these men don’t attach all that much to life. What connects them, rather, is a longing, the longing to preserve whatever shred of human dignity is left to them.

But what do we really mean when we talk about humanity and human dignity? What social and moral criteria do we employ? For Kaganof, there are no presuppositions for human existence. The human being, he believes, has the ability to invent himself, and that ability, that freedom, is both a privilege and a curse. That is why his characters seek the dark and the margins of life. That is why they electrify their brains with drugs and torment their bodies to the farthest limits. They celebrate their limitlessness by transgressing all the rules, even if it means physical or mental ruin, because they know, consciously or unconsciously, that hidden in the transgression lies the ecstasy, the power that lifts us above ourselves, towards the light.
Most of the characters never get that far, however. They go round and round in their limitlessness like guinea pigs in a maze. We look at them and see people for whom the transgression is an end in itself, and it doesn’t matter if they over indulge in sex and drugs in the Amsterdam party circuit (the film Wasted; Naar de klote in Dutch), or sink into the world of criminals and prostitutes in Tokyo (Shabondama Elegy), or scour the bars and drug dens of Capetown (the novel Hectic). Wherever they live, whatever they do and whatever their age, what Kaganof’s people have in common is their recognizability. We recognize them as exponents of a time without memory, without direction, without passion, without morals. Time as a vacuum: our time.
Is Kaganof a moralist? You would almost think so to look at the sharpness with which he renders the moral decay of his characters. But morality as a system of ethical principles and norms is incompatible with what for Kaganof constitutes the artistic vocation. For him, Good and Evil are concepts like Identity: they lay down in the form of rules and regulations that which is essentially fleeting and mutable and, above all, infinitely nuanced. Morality is tantamount to a denial of the depth of the human spirit, a depth that, oddly enough, is mainly perceptible in what is generally regarded as Evil. And that is the area in which Kaganof chooses to be active.
In doing so, he often assumes the position in his books of an involved observer on the one hand and one who sees himself in relative terms on the other. This results in descriptions that are as remorseless as they are humorous and that attest to a profound feeling for detail, such as this fragment from Sugarman and Other Bitter Stories that he himself published in South Africa:
“Brigitta, not yet 21, studies Drama, is distantly related to Hitler. She’s wearing black. Hair dyed purple. Swastika decals on her fingernails. Bored.
Diamond bursts in, kisses the table, kicks Brigitta. He’s wearing a great t-shirt. It says ‘Eat the homeless’. Brigitta kisses his boots and licks him. He kicks her again in her ample buttocks. Diamond smiles insanely, his speed blackened teeth threatening to spill out of his mouth any second now.”
Evil is a choice that only can be made by those who know what Good is. Evil is consciousness as well as loss of innocence and security. Those who embrace Evil are doomed to live with the realization that there is no absolute Truth and that nothing is what it seems. That is why Evil is such a perfect fit in modern life. Living with a sense of insecurity became a condition of our life when, as Hannah Arendt writes in Vita Activa, we began to realize along with Descartes that ‘the nature of Being is such that its manifestations can be nothing but delusions and the images that are derived from those manifestations nothing but hallucinations.’ Everything today is wavering now that science has once and for all shown the limits of the senses and the power of reason, and technology has eliminated the difference between reality and unreality. For this reason we see the good God today, in the words of Arendt, as a Dieu trompeur, an evil spirit who with his cunning trickery ‘has created a being and instilled in it a certain notion of what truth is, but at the same time has poisoned it with such different capacities that it will never be capable of finding one single truth or of being certain of one single thing.’
Kaganof is the son of this deceitful god. He made that choice the minute he picked up a motion picture camera and suddenly found himself able to create the world anew. He filmed not only what he saw, but also what, from the point of view of prevailing morality, should not be seen: the sinful lusts of the body. In Kyodai Makes the Big Time, made when he was still at Film Academy in Amsterdam, he convinced actor Koos Vos to masturbate for the camera – and won a Golden Calf, an important Dutch film prize.

The body has always been a central element in his work. The human being is his body. He bases his identity on it from the moment he says ‘I’, but even that makes him afraid of losing his body again, something he always sees happening with other people. That is why for Kaganof the body must endure everything it fears: torture, sexual excess, sensual chaos and even (as in the film Beyond Ultra Violence – Uneasy Listening By Merzbow) hara kiri. And always in a ritual way, because it is through ritual that the body transcends itself, particularly the frightened mouse that is hiding within it and is so tightly attached to itself.

But inherent in that transcendence is violation: a transgression of borders that is neither socially nor politically acceptable. The person who determines his own death places himself outside the rule of law. He withdraws himself from what the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in his book Homo Sacer, calls ‘bio-politics’: the ‘process of discipline, imposed by the political system in which the human being as a living creature becomes both the object and the subject of political power’. It is political power that determines how far a person’s freedom may extend in making decisions about his own life, whether it be a question of drug use, smoking and sex before marriage or of suicide, euthanasia and dying a hero’s death for one’s country.
In line with this came Kaganof’s Western 4.33. That film, which came out in 2002, is a documentary about a mineworkers’ village in Namibia built by German colonists between 1904 and 1907 and based on a model concentration camp that the British had designed in South Africa during the Boer War. More than sixty thousand people from the Herero tribe lost their lives there.

Kaganof filmed the abandoned camp during the winter in black and white. We see barbed wire, fences, dark barracks, a vast white landscape and a black silence. Not a living soul. Then images – in colour – of a woman mourning over a lost love with a man’s voice speaking in an African language (no subtitles, because, as Kaganof once explained during an interview, ‘The Germans never took the trouble to understand what the Herero were saying.’) Murder, loss, lack of understanding, colonialism: the words take shape in the images, forming not a story but an emotion, a scorch mark on the soul.
Kaganof is a brilliant storyteller, but his films don’t follow a story line. They follow the image. He employs that image like a tone in a musical piece, setting it in motion, driving it along, draining it of its colour, letting it flow apart or run over into other images, staccato and dazzling or slowly diminishing, vaguely trilled or clear and taut. It is the moving image at maximum intensity, and in all its movements it shows itself to be as nimble and transparent as thoughts in the brain. We look through the bodies, the birds and the landscapes and see, as in the four Suprematist Compositions, the body of a dancer like a continuously dying and reviving cellular structure, falling mountains, a dog’s carcass as a relief map of the earth and – just like that – a pair of squabbling pigeons.
Kaganof is dead, we suddenly read in white on black between two Suprematist Compositions. Kaganof, son of a god with a thousand tongues, has a great deal more to tell us.
Translation: Nancy Forest-Flier


















































































